GOOD GOVERNANCE IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE: THE EUROPEAN UNION AS AN ANCHOR FOR REFORM by HOEN, Herman
ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGEE IN THE PROCESS 
OF EASTWARD EXPANSION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
ECONOMIC AND ENYIRONMENTAL STUDIES No. 2 OPOLE 2002
Herman HOEN, University of Groningen, the Netherlands*
* Herman Hoen is Professor in International Political Economy at the Department of 
International Relations of Groningen University (the Netherlands), P.O. Box 716, 9700 
AS Groningen, The Netherlands. E-mail: h.w.hoen@let.rug.nl.
1 The phrase “dual transformations” underlines the fact that, sińce the collapse of com- 
munism, both a political and an economic transformation were set in motion. The term is 
borrowed from David L. Bartlett [1997].
GOOD GOVERNANCE
IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE: 
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FOR REFORM
Introduction
The system-switch in Central and Eastern Europę from a politically 
authoritarian system with mandatory economic planning to a democratic 
order based on market co-ordination has presented one of the major 
challenges in contemporary history. In order to fulfil these tasks, there 
were no historical precedents to rely upon, nor were there clear-cut con- 
ceptual frameworks to underpin these “dual transformations” J Concern- 
ing Central and Eastern Europę, scholars seem to have been embar- 
rassed time and time again. In retrospect, of course, they have tended to 
present the facts so as to prove their own correctness, but two aspects 
should not be overlooked.
Firstly, there is no well-attested evidence of any forecast regarding 
the collapse of the communist system. On the contrary, discussions of 
the existence and feasibility of a socialist economic order were closed 
several decades ago [see Lavigne, 1999, and Wagener, 1979]. No matter 
precisely how and in what form, economic co-ordination by means of 
central planning simply existed. It was referred to as “real existing
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socialism”. The system had its advantages and disadvantages and the 
prevailing view was that it needed to be “reformed' rather than “trans- 
formed’. After all, communism and its concomitant organisation of cen­
tral planning had an outstanding reputation in terms of stability.
Secondly, once the curtain fell in December 1989, nobody really knew 
how to cope with the transformation. As van Brabant [1993, pp. 80-1] 
put it, “they [economists] know next to nothing about undoing the plan­
ning enoironment and coming to grips with the wide-ranging legacies of 
the earlier communist dominance in societal affairs”. Mainstream con- 
cepts failed, sińce within these concepts institutions are perceived as 
constant. It is acknowledged that institutional data do have an impact 
on economic performance, but they are in no way subject to change. In 
other words, institutions are not explicitly taken into account. That also 
holds for the most important institution, the market itself, which is as- 
sumed to function relatively well. Conseąuently, on the basis of these 
analyses it is difficult to theoretically underpin the creation of markets. 
Transformation, however, impinges on the change of institutions, not so 
much on the effect of a given order on performance.
This article scrutinises the transformation processes in Central and 
Eastern Europę and builds on the arguments put forward in the tradi- 
tion of political economy. Its basie assumptions are that designing 
a market economy is not to be mistaken for destroying the institutional 
legacy of communism - a market order is not the negation of central 
planning - and that mutual dependency between democratisation and 
market reform has a definite impact on the path of transformation. In 
other words, economic systems are understood as irreversible and 
path-dependent. One cannot simply dismantle the former regime and 
each step in the reform process influences the set of alternatives for the 
reforms that still need to be implemented. The legacy of the past is deci- 
sive. This is not to deny that the success or failure of transformation 
largely depends on the policies applied, but that the extent, to which 
these appropriate policies are feasible, is pivotal.
In the remainder of this article, the validity and the conseąuences of 
these assumptions are further addressed. The following section is theore- 
tical in naturę. It centres on the (political) motives for and the impedi- 
ments to market reforms. The leading thread is the political likelihood of 
transformation based upon assumptions of economic behaviour. Subse- 
ąuently, the arguments turn to the issues of institutional change and 
“good gooernance” and the extent to which it can be furthered by external 
conditionality. The focus will be on the role of the European Union (EU).
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Democratisation and market reform
The absence of historical precedents and theoretical tools led to 
a broad pallet of transformation policies applied in Central and Eastern 
Europę from the beginning of the 1990s. Besides, despite great similari- 
ties in communist dictatorship, the political and economic legacy varied 
enormously among the countries facing the tasks of transformation. As 
a result, different strategies emerged and, where policies were similar, 
performances diverged. Apparently, what was suitable for one country 
proved inappropriate for another. There was, however, one common de- 
nominator in the transformation experience. Ali Central and Eastern 
European faced a large contraction in economic activity at the beginning 
of the transformation. What came to be known as the “transformation 
crisis” was much deeper and lasted much longer than expected. The idea 
that under central planning there was a large amount of output that 
only existed on paper did not really alter this view. The extent to which 
“output that was not” induced a nominał overestimation of economic de- 
cline appeared to be a minor short-term problem. A fundamental prob­
lem of the former regime was the “output that was, but should not”.2 
A lot of what was produced under central planning appeared to be obso- 
lete in a market environment. Therefore, production had to be restruc- 
tured.
2 The necessity of the crisis is well documented. See, for example, Lavigne [1999, 
pp. 150-161]; Bruno [1992]; Schmieding [1993],
3 For GDP levels, see European Bank for Reconstruction and Deoelopment, Transition 
Report (London various years). See Herman W. Hoen [1998] on the misleading qualifica- 
tion of transformation strategies in the Czech Republic and Hungary.
It goes without saying that some countries have proven to be morę 
successful in regaining economic growth than others. But ten years after 
the collapse of communism, only Poland and Slovenia have surpassed 
the 1989 level of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The Czech Republic, 
which was initially tagged as the “brightest pupil in class”, appeared to 
suffer a crisis and did not reach the magie mark. At the celebration of 
the second quinquennium, Hungary, which during the communist era 
became known as the “brightest shed in the camp”, was also performing 
at a level of economic activity below that of 1989 [Winiecki, 1993].3 The 
further East one observed the situation, the morę dismal the picture. For 
example, in many countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS), the level of economic activity was less than half of that in 1989. 
Russia, being the largest country of the CIS, fitted into this gloomy pat- 
tern. On top of that, the rouble crisis which emerged in the summer of
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1998 had a dramatic effect upon the economic performance of 1999, 
which again showed a decline of approximately 5 per cent of Russian 
GDP. Ten years after the collapse of communism, there appeared to be 
light at the end of the tunnel for most of the Central and Eastern Euro- 
pean countries. But for quite a number of countries, it was the light of 
an oncoming train.
Now the ąuestion is: “why was the transformation so cumbersome?’ 
Many authors stressed the fact that the transformation to a democratic 
order based upon market co-ordination was too all encompassing. A huge 
number of painful reforms had indeed to be carried out, such as macro- 
economic stabilisation, liberalisation of prices, production and trade, mi- 
croeconomic restructuring and, last but not least, institutional reforms 
to underpin the rules of the market gamę. The authors adducing this ar­
gument focus upon the speed and seąuencing of reforms.4 But even in 
the (hypothetical) case, in which one is able to minimise the costs of 
transformation by calculating the speed and seąuencing of reforms, the 
ąuestion remains: “is one politically able to implement the reforms at the 
desired time and at desired speed?’
4 Ibidem, Chapter 1. The reader is also referred to, for example, Ben Slay, “Rapid 
versus Gradual Economic Transition”, Radio Free Europę/ Radio Liberty Report, 3 (1994) 
pp. 31-42; Peter Murrell, “Evolutionary and Radical Approaches to Economic Reform”, 
Economics of Planning, 25 (1992) pp. 79-95.
5See, for example, Claus Offe, “Capitalism by Democratic Design? Democratic Theory 
Facing the Triple Transition in East Central Europę”, Social Research, 58, 4 (1991) pp. 
865-92; Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in 
Eastern Europę and Latin America (Cambridge 1991).
6See Leszek Balcerowicz [1995]; Gerard Roland [1994],
This observation triggered an approach in the tradition of political 
economy. Most of the authors who follow this linę of thought address the 
problematic relation between democratisation on one hand, market re­
form on the other. The argument goes that democracy might impede im- 
plementation of the economic reforms enumerated above, sińce these 
will necessarily have distributional welfare effects. Therefore, there 
should be a minimal level of economic development in order that demo­
cratisation and market economic reform successfully coincide.5 Others 
have emphasised the argument of political credit during the period im- 
mediately following the revolution. This view implies that for a limited 
period of time, policy makers do have the possibility of applying some 
kind of “scorched-earth policy”, sińce the former regime can be held re- 
sponsible for the negative welfare conseąuences of transformation.6 
Finally, it has been argued that democratisation facilitated rather than 
impeded market reforms in Central and Eastern Europę. According to
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the proponents of this linę of thought, there was ongoing political inter- 
mediation during communism, which settled distributional conflicts. The 
revolution of 1989, therefore, not only entailed the end of communism it- 
self, but also the end of political influence in the field of economic regula- 
tion [Barlett, 1997].
Transformation as a “public good”
This section addresses the process of transformation from a centrally 
planned to a market economy within the framework of political economy. 
As stated above, mainstream economics - neo-classical economics - does 
not really suffice to theoretically underpin the transformation, because it 
considers institutions as data. What matters is not so much the fact that 
institutions affect economic performance, but that institutions are sub- 
ject to change. Now the ąuestion is: “what is the probability that they 
will change and conoerge to market institutions?' This ąuestion goes well 
beyond pure economics. Leaving aside the problem that the desired or­
der is far from elear to those responsible for reform, a political economic 
theory has to focus upon the problem of how to accomplish a new eco­
nomic order from a given situation. This is not a completely untrodden 
field for economists, though the purpose has always been to conceive po- 
licy targets within a given economic order, rather than contriving trans­
formation targets and instruments, that is, the conversion of one eco­
nomic order to the other.
We will not refute the basie assumptions of neo-classical economics, of 
which those presuming the rational behaviour of utility maximising 
agents are the pivotal ones, but gratefully make use of the politico-eco- 
nomic theories that gained momentum in the 1960s and 1970s. These 
complemented neo-classical thinking and have put forward that govern- 
ment policy is to be explained in terms of mutual exchange between the 
targets and the behaviour of civilians, civil servants and politicians.7 Ali 
these actors will try to maximise utility, which may result in a sub- 
optimal outeome at the macro-level. Now, which instruments are at the 
disposal of reformers for the implementation of institutional change? 
Regarding economic reforms in the 1970s and 1980s, it was legitimate to 
ask why, for example, in Hungary, during the stage of a one-party 
system in which relations between the party and the other institutions 
were so unambiguously set, the finał results of economic reform deviated 
to such a large extent from the targets set by the communist party.
7 For an excellent overview see Bruno S. Frey [1978],
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Considering economic transformation in the 1990s, the search for policy 
Instruments, and the (economic) interests they might serve, is simply in- 
dispensable.
There are good arguments for regarding market reform as a public 
good. Non-exclusiveness and non-rivalry are the two characteristics of 
these commodities. The first implies that no one can be excluded from 
using it, whereas the latter points to the fact that individual use of the 
commodity does not diminish total stocks available. If this is the case, 
nobody is willing to pay a positive market price. Though there are not as 
many public goods as one is initially inclined to believe, transformation 
seems to fulfil the conditions for such a good. A market economy pro- 
vides freedom of contract, guarantees competition and facilitates legał 
opportunities to enforce obedience to the rules. It is available to all 
(non-exclusive) and the use being madę of the market rules does not 
limit the possibility of other users (non-rivalry). Textbook economics 
tells us that in order to have a public good one needs a special body to 
provide it, though not necessarily a government agency.8 The fact that 
transformation can be seen as a public good makes it unlikely to emerge.
8 This idea is borrowed from Frank Bónker [1999],
9See Thrainn Eggertsson [1990, pp. 171-80].
What is at stake here is the argument of external effects. As in the 
case of growth theory and technological change, it can be stated that 
what is beneficial to one is beneficial to all. From the assumption that 
transformation is a public good it follows that the problem of free riding 
has to be faced. If all individuals want to have a free ride, transforma­
tion may never be achieved. In other words, it needs to be organised, 
that is, “governed”.
The behaviour of individuals in groups is crucial. In this respect, an il- 
luminating point of view can be found in interest-group theory.9 One of 
the implicit assumptions in this theory is that some groups are perfectly 
able to look after their interests, while other groups are not. It implies 
that eventually an unbalanced power structure will emerge. Mancur 
Olson played a pioneering role in the debate on organisation of collective 
interests. He concluded that the size of a group is decisive in the extent 
to which an organisation is successful. In smali groups, individual effort 
is perceived as necessary for achieving the common interest. The contri- 
bution of an individual is not felt in large groups and, therefore, free ri­
ding endangers the common interest [Olson, 1965].
A classic example of undesired interest structures is the case of tariffs. 
For a society as a whole, the erection of trade restrictions is detrimental
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to welfare. Producers in a particular industry, however, may benefit 
substantially. In other words, the costs are spread over a large number 
of people and evoke only minor protests, while the benefits flow to 
a smali well-identified number.10 The individual’s decision to join 
a group or not is supposed to be rational and in accordance with his or 
her own interest.
10The example is taken from Annę O. Krueger.
11 For an overview, see Hoen [1998, pp. 164-6].
According to Olson’s subseąuent publications on interest-group beha- 
viour as an explanation for economic growth and stagnation, an impor- 
tant constraint in generating economic growth is deployed by so-called 
distributional coalitions [Olson, 1982], These are interest groups, which 
try to change the income distribution to their members’ benefit [Ibid., 
pp. 43-7], Instead of contributing to an increase in total income, distri­
butional coalitions attempt to have a larger share of a given ąuantity of 
welfare, a phenomenon of which is the classic example of rent seeking. 
Besides distributional coalitions, encompassing organisations are identi- 
fied [Ibid., pp. 47-53]. When looking after their interests, encompassing 
interest groups do take notice of the impact of their activities on national 
welfare. Not only the division but also growth of income is considered 
important to these groups.
Theories of interest-group behaviour have been applied predominantly 
to market economies. Since regulation perceived as undesirable assumes 
market intervention, it is obvious that attention has been restricted to 
this economic order.11 Application of interest-group theories to centrally 
planned economies appeared only after the collapse of communism and 
all the studies focused upon the Soviet Union and on classic mandatory 
planning rather than on parametric planning, as was applied in Hun- 
gary from 1968 and in Poland from 1982 [Murell and Olson, 1991; Olson, 
1992], The successful period of vast economic growth in the Soviet Union 
(1950-1965) is explained in terms of leadership. One could even speak of 
a pure property rights approach, that is, by assuming Stalin as the 
owner of the Soviet Union. During this period, Soviet society was within 
the competence of very few. Their political fate was largely dependent 
upon the well-being of the community. This linę of thought follows 
a cost-benefit analysis. There was a smali group, which had encompass­
ing interests. The decline of the Soviet Union begins with the Brezhnev 
era. Gradually an unbalanced interest structure emerged. Ministries 
and enterprises became indispensable agents in supplying Information
2 — Economic
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to the planning authorities. They behaved as distributional coalitions 
and “institutional sclerosis” crept in.
This theory has only been marginally applied to the transformation 
processes in Central and Eastern Europę. This is predominantly due to 
its theoretical flaws. There are many objections to the theory, ranging 
from mono-causality to the point that the theory is hard to formalise 
mathematically. In the context of this article, two flaws will have to be 
mentioned. First of all, certain aspects of the behaviour of groups can 
hardly be explained in terms of rational economic calculation. Many or- 
ganisations hołd broader interests and are not purely economically moti- 
vated. Classic examples are solidarity movements, where members do 
not have a direct interest in the achievement of the organisation’s goal. 
But there are other examples as well. For instance, why would one con- 
sider walking to a polling station and vote for a new president or parlia- 
ment? The probability that your vote is decisive is negligible. Nonę the 
less, many take the effort and do vote. Considering the revolution of 
1989 in Central and Eastern Europę, the case is even clearer. The deci- 
sion to join demonstrations against the communist rulers, for example in 
Dresden, was a risky adventure and could coincide with high costs. At 
the same time, the expected marginal effect of the individual demonstra­
tor was practically zero. The individual costs were elear, whereas the in- 
dividual benefits were difficult to identify. So, why not have a free 
lunch?12 It can be concluded from this critical notion on rationality, that 
the theory is not able to explain the emergence of Solidarity (Poland) 
and Civic Forum (Czechoslovakia). The criticism on the assumption of 
rationality essentially lays bare the fact that the theory of interest 
groups is much better equipped to clarify a status quo than the dynamics 
of system switches. It underlines the improbability of market reform, 
whereas in Central and Eastern Europę the opposite could be observed.
12There are numerous other examples. For extensive list see Brian Barry and Russil 
Hardin [1982].
The second flaw in Olson’s interest-group theory is that it does not 
acknowledge the role of leadership in the provision of public goods 
[Frohlich et. al, 1971], This point is not an attack on the assumption of 
rationality, but focuses on the fact that some individuals perform the 
role of a kind “Schumpeterian” entrepreneur. Individuals may have dif- 
ferent time perspectives. Certain individuals may perceive it an invest- 
ment to step forward and take the initiative in organising and defending 
the interest of a group. It implies that - taking group interests into ac- 
count - they accept that the individual commitment may be very large, 
but individual benefits may emerge later. These exceed the gains for the
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group as a whole and, therefore, are worth the effort. In the context of 
Central and Eastern Europę one might take political leadership of for- 
mer opposition figures like Vaclav Havel as an example. Once the group 
interests are realised, these “entrepreneurs” become likely candidates for 
high political positions, such as presidency. It has to be added that the 
individual benefit is not only to be calculated in terms of income, but 
also prestige.
Despite these theoretical drawbacks, there are still good reasons to 
study the transformation in Central and Eastern Europę from the per- 
spective of interest-group theory. As noted, the second theoretical flaw 
can easily be perceived as a complement to, rather than as a refutation, 
of the pivotal idea. Moreover, the fact that, according to the theory, what 
happened in Central and Eastern Europę was unlikely to happen - the 
coincidence of democratisation and market reform — makes it extremely 
interesting to scrutinise what conditions should be fulfilled to avoid free 
riding and to examine the extent to which these have been fulfilled in 
the region. Despite the fact that there were many failures during the 
transformation processes, it has to be stressed again that there has been 
a return of communists, but no return of communism. It is a search for 
“good gouernance”: a policy which defends the interests of the society at 
large and not necessarily the particular interests of smali groups.
Several types of control can prevent free-riding behaviour. This is the 
problem of governance. Firstly, one can apply “selectiue incentwes”. 
Those who are not willing to pay, will not benefit. For the idea of achie- 
ving transformation as a public good, selective incentives are somewhat 
problematic, sińce by definition, a public good is non-exclusive. The obvi- 
ous example is the membership of labour unions. But there are numer- 
ous other examples. An alternative can be found in the solution of what 
is known as “voluntary coercion”. There are many instances of this op- 
tion. The best known is the forced membership of labour unions in order 
to benefit from their achievements. This seems a valid argument for 
transformation as well. Those who share a common interest are willing 
to accept forced membership of a group, sińce they acknowledge the dan- 
ger of free riding.
The concept of “ooluntary coercion” highłights the role of International 
organisations as key actors. In the most broad perspective, one can per- 
ceive a mutual dependency between integration with the West and 
transformation from a centrally planned to a market economy in Central 
and Eastern Europę. On the one hand, continuing reforms will expedite 
the process of integration. On the other hand, integration with the West 
can be seen as a stick, which can be used to implement necessary but 
painful economic reforms. Once the perspective on integration with the
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West is perceived as real, there will be political willingness to co-operate 
and reform. Morę specifically, this argument focuses upon the role of in- 
ternational organisations and the extent to which they are able to en- 
force “good gooernance”.
“Voluntary coercion” as an option to combat free-rider behaviour will 
be examined. It focuses on what might be referred to as the “G-words” in 
transformation: good governance. For the sake of clarity, it is stressed 
once morę that good governance was not the self-evident policy in the re­
gion. However, it is assumed that those countries which applied a trans­
formation policy that served the interests of the society at large, rather 
than those of distributional coalitions, had a better performance.
The European Union and good governance
The section addresses the extent to which the EU is able to serve as 
a catalyst for reform in Central and Eastern Europę. In doing so, it fo­
cuses on the perspective of accession as a means of “uoluntary coercion”. 
While the Bretton Woods institutions have cautiously ventured into the 
governance arena, regional organisations have madę no pretence of their 
active engagement in the domestic political affairs of current and pro- 
spective members. The Council of Europe’s human rights provisions 
have induced a number of East European states (e.g. Slovakia, Romania) 
to enact legislation aimed at protecting freedom of religion and impro- 
ving minority rights. The EU has exerted a much broader impact on the 
region. Since the early 1990s, the European Commission has used seve- 
ral financial facilities, such as Poland and Hungary: Aid for the Recon- 
struction of Economies (PHARE) and Technical Assistance for the Com- 
monwealth of Independent States (TACIS)) to promote education reform 
and other sector-specific projects in the transitional countries. Morę re- 
cently, the EU’s regional development arm, the European Inuestment 
Bank (EIB), whose operations were previously limited to current mem­
bers, obtained the Commission’s authorisation to initiate funding acti- 
vities to prospective members. To this end, the EIB has established 
a special “Pre-Accession Support Fund' dedicated to the five former com- 
munist states - Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia 
- included in the first wave of the EU’s eastward enlargement.13
13 At the Luxembourg summit in December 1997 it was decided to make a distinction 
between countries ready for negotiation and those not ready for negotiation. The five 
mentioned were negotiable. Later the distinction was abolished.
However, the EU’s greatest impact on Eastern Europę has not come 
through direct financial assistance or IMF-style conditionality. Rather,
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the puli of entry into the Community locked the former communist 
States into a trajectory of convergence toward the EU’s political, institu- 
tional, and regulatory norms. This process of “anticipatory adaptation” 
began in the early 1990s, when the EU signed association agreements 
with ten Central and Eastern European countries.14 The immediate 
effect of those agreements was to lower trade restrictions on most indus- 
trial goods and initiate a phased liberalisation of steel and textile Pro­
ducts. Their broader import was to compel associate member govern- 
ments to enact a wide rangę of legislative reforms aimed at preparing for 
eventual fuli admission to the EU — despite the fact that the association 
agreements conveyed to the East European states no automatic right to 
accession and offered them no timetable for doing so. For sceptics of re- 
gional integration, the vague language on accession suggested that East­
ern Europę might reside in the semi-permanent limbo of the EU’s half- 
way house, a la Turkey.
14This term was coined by Stnphan Haggard, Marc Levy, Andrew Moravcsik and 
Knlypso Nicolaidis [1993].
The political dynamie of regional integration changed dramatically at 
the December 1997 summit in Luxembourg, when the EU heads of state 
— following the Commission’s cali for eastward enlargement in its 
“Agenda 200ff’ - invited the “East European Five” to begin negotiations 
for fuli admission. Since the formal accession process began, the fast 
track countries have enacted a wide rangę of measures to comply with 
the EU’s acąuis communitaire-. financial regulation, accounting stan- 
dards, intellectual property rights, anti-trust law, health and safety 
standards, environmental protection, judicial reform, public procure- 
ment practices, and administrative capacity. Meanwhile, the launching 
of the European Monetary Union (EMU) in January 1999 has spurred 
the Eastern European accession candidates to begin preparatory reforms 
of their foreign exchange systems, despite the fact that few expect those 
countries formally to enter the EMU until the middle or end of the first 
decade of the new millennium.
Of course, EU enlargement has exerted a major impact on governance 
arrangements in other regions. For instance, in the early 1990s the Eu­
ropean Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries that had pending appli- 
cations for EU membership also modified their domestic institutions in 
preparation for accession. But Sweden, Austria, and Finland were al- 
ready developed market economies and constitutional democracies, 
which meant that local authorities needed only to reform existing struć - 
tures to meet EU standards. By contrast, the new Eastern European de­
mocracies had to build much of their legał and regulatory systems from
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scratch. To this end, the governments of the Visegrad countries set up 
special procedures to ensure that all new legislation conformed to EU 
law [Nicolaidis, 1993].
The institutional tabula rasa of the former communist countries has 
thus enabled the EU to mould East European governance structures to 
a degree far surpassing the Washington agencies, whose conditional 
lending programmes often do little morę than reinforce the predisposi- 
tion of pro-market policymakers in member governments. While the EU 
has supplied technical and financial assistance to support gover- 
nance-related reforms in Central and Eastern Europę, its impact derives 
primarily from the mere lure of fuli membership, which induces regional 
authorities unilaterally and voluntarily to configure their domestic insti- 
tutions along Western lines. Among other things, this underscores the 
profound asymmetry of power and interests between the Eastern Euro­
pean candidate countries and the EU - what is driving the integration 
process is the former group’s eagerness to get in, rather than the latter’s 
importuning of them to join.
Further demonstrating the potency of regional integration as a reform 
mechanism in the former communist states is the fact that the East Eu­
ropean governments are adopting EU-type governance structures de- 
spite continued uncertainty over when (and even if) accession will actu- 
ally occur. The EU has repeatedly moved the target for eastward 
enlargement, but this has not deterred post-communist governments 
from proceeding as if the target were within grasp. The puli of EU inte­
gration has even affected governance structures in those East European 
countries left out of the first wave of enlargement - Bułgaria, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia- as well as some countries of the Bałkan 
peninsula and the CIS that have no serious prospects of ever being ad- 
mitted as full-fledged members. For these countries, the fear of being left 
behind the fast-track states serves to nudge regional governments to- 
ward the EU’s governance norms, despite their understanding that for- 
mal accession may never happen.15
15 It is interesting to notę, though, that economic performance of the countries that are 
definitely not in a position to join the EU is much worse than those that are. See Gerard 
Roland [1997],
The enlargement process: why so difficult?
The enlargement of the EU dominates the political agenda the of 
European Commission. At his official inauguration as chairman of the 
European Commission, Romano Prodi underlined this by stating that
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“enlargement is in the gen.es of Europę” [0’Donell, 1999]. By proclaiming 
this, his political fate became closely tied to the success of enlargement. 
It was also Prodi who madę a strong argument for ceasing the differenti- 
ation between aspirant Central and Eastern European countries of the 
first - Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and the Czech Republic - and 
the second category - Bułgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and 
Slovakia, which distinction was installed in December 1997 at the EU 
summit in Luxembourg. At the Helsinki summit in December 1999, the 
decision was madę to perceive all reąuests for entry into the EU as nego- 
tiable and not only those of the countries in the first tranche.
The agricultural sector was the last chapter in the screening process. 
It was this part of the screening which contributed to a gloomy picture 
on the feasibility of EU enlargement. The enlargement process seems to 
very problematic and cumbersome. There were ąuite a few diplomatic 
conflicts between, for example, Poland and the EU on the ąuestion of 
direct income support for Polish farmers after accession, progress re- 
ports on the convergence of national legislation of the candidate coun­
tries with EU legislation are far from positive, and last but not least, the 
EU is unable or unwilling to draft a elear time Schedule for enlargement. 
These facts illustrate incompatible interests within the Commission 
and a loss of momentum in the enlargement process [European Commis­
sion, 2000]. I will not scrutinise a possible lack of dedication, but focus 
upon the erroneous thought that the EU will not benefit from a ąuick en­
largement.
The discussion on the feasibility of enlargement eventually narrows 
down to the costs of enlargement. Without any doubt, these will be sub- 
stantial, but, for political reasons, they are often overestimated. What 
are the costs of enlargement for the current EU members? Two types of 
costs can be distinguished. Firstly, there are costs related to necessary 
adjustments in the production and market structures in the current 
member states. This is not only an agricultural issue. Industry is ex- 
pected to be forced to adjust as well through changing the relative com- 
petitiveness of industries. Furthermore, labour market relations may be 
disrupted through an expected inerease in migration flows. Secondly, 
there are costs due to budgetary conseąuences of enlargement. An in­
erease in claims on the structural and the cohesion funds of the EU are 
foreseen, as well as negative budgetary conseąuences due to financial 
transfers in the Common Agricultural Policy are at stake.
Trade liberalisation with the aspirant countries proceeded rapidly af­
ter the first Association Agreements were ratified and implemented. Be- 
sides, trade relations between the EU and the EU candidates shifted 
from inter to intra-industry trade. That implies that the budgetary costs
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are expected to be of morę importance.16 But a firmer statement is possi- 
ble: there are only positive welfare effects of enlargement to be expected 
through division of labour and specialisation. Studies of the Centre for 
European Policy Studies reveal that this also holds true for the Mediter- 
ranean countries of the EU [Baldwin et. al, 1997], Immigration does al- 
ter the picture. The morę likely problem of the candidate nations seems 
to be the immobility within the respective countries from regions with 
high unemployment to regions in which there is strong demand for la­
bour [Bauer and Zimmermann, 1997]. Therefore, a huge influx of labour 
migrations is unlikely once the candidates are able to join.
16For an extensive overview of the Association Agreements see Alan Mayhew [1998], 
On the recent trade liberalisation between the EU and the candidate nations see Heiko 
Fritz and Herman W. Hoen [2000].
The budgetary conseąuences are to be taken very seriously. Many drew 
the conclusion that the EU can simply not afford the enlargement, which 
is now under negotiation. The welfare level of the accession countries is 
much below the EU average. Therefore, massive claims on the structural 
funds are self-evident. Besides, a number of countries are morę agricul- 
tural, which threatens the price and income supporting system of the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which is currently expensive anyway. 
When discussing the conseąuences for the CAP, the Polish candidacy is 
particularly at stake. Entry of Poland alone implies an increase in the 
number of farmers from 7 to 11 million and it has to be added that Polish 
agriculture is not the most efficient branch [ 0’Donell, 2000].
The average prices of agricultural products in Central and Eastern 
Europę are below the EU average. The dilemma is that facilitating sub- 
sidies implies bankruptcy of the CAP, while refusing support will lead to 
a situation of subordinated agriculture in the new member states. A new 
revision of the CAP in linę with the MacSharry reform of 1992 - a shift 
from indirect price support to direct income support - is not just advis- 
able but simply necessary. Diminishing price distortions among agricul­
tural products within the EU has the advantage that — due to lower 
prices in the candidate countries - there will be no extra financial claims 
on “Brussels”, provided income support is temporary. Enlargement is 
a perfect incentive to revise the CAP. The suggestion of not allowing in­
come support for Central and Eastern European farmers, sińce they 
need not be compensated for price support that was granted in the past, 
has to be refuted. This implies that a country may become a member, 
but its farmers not.
Besides the fact that enlargement will press the EU towards a morę 
efficient organisation, there is another argument to proceed with ąuick
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accession. As previously said, the dual transformation has been painful 
and is not completed yet. The high costs of transformation may termi- 
nate the necessary political credit to complete the implementation of 
a well-functioning market economy embedded in a democratic order. The 
perspective of becoming a member in time, preferably visualised in the 
form a time Schedule, will facilitate the political authorities in the re- 
spective countries to implement these necessary reforms. For reasons of 
stability in Europę as a whole, these reforms are pivotal to the EU as 
well. In other words, transformation and integration are mutually de­
pendent. Ongoing liberalisation and other market reform will facilitate 
entry, but accession itself may serve as a catalyst for reform.
Enlargement reąuires adjustments in both the EU and the candidate 
countries. It is important to realise that the political and economic trans- 
formations were cumbersome and a far from self-evident process. The 
condition of the acceptation of the “acquis communautaire" in fuli, could 
endanger the feasibility of the anchor for reform, trigger free riding be- 
haviour and hamper the emergence of transformation as a public good. 
Besides these conditions put the burden of mutual adjustment too much 
on the shoulder of the candidate nations, which is not in the interests of 
either of the negotiating partners. Instead of insisting on a completed 
transformation, transition periods seem to be morę suitable for the new 
members. After all, the Mediterranean countries were so facilitated, 
even in the field of trade issues. That results in a plea for a “Europę a la 
Carte"}1
Conclusion
The “dual transformations" in Central and Eastern Europę have 
proven to be cumbersome. The economic, crisis which the countries were 
confronted with in the 1990s, lasted longer and was much morę severe 
than initially expected. This put a heavy burden on the available politi­
cal credit necessary to complete the transformation to a market economy 
embedded in a democratic political order. The classic arguments bor- 
rowed from political economy also pinpoint the unlikeliness of such dual 
transformations, sińce the system switch can be seen as a public good 
and the emergence of these suffer from the problem of free-riding.
Voluntary coercion is an option to prevent free riding. This touches 
upon the issue of good governance, which is mostly studied form the
17 The phrase is from Ralf Dahrendorf. In the Jean Monnet lecture of 1979, he elabo- 
rated the arrangement in which each member should hołd the possibility to decide what 
extent common policy is to be accepted. [Nevin, 1990, p. 343]
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perspective of conditionality imposed by International financial institu- 
tions, such as the International Monetary fund and the World Bank. In 
this paper a different perspective was chosen. It elaborated the role of 
the EU as a regionał organisation and the extent to which it could serve 
as an anchor for reform, i.e. preventing political restrictions to becoming 
effective.
The conclusion is that the EU indeed fulfils an important anchor func- 
tion. Having said this, it is dissatisfying to observe that the EU is unable 
to give the enlargement process crucial momentum. The current members 
remain focused upon the costs of enlargement, whereas they neglect the 
crucial benefits, among which streamlining the structure of the EU is the 
most important. Part of the recent outcome of the Nice summit was wel- 
comed by the candidate countries. Especially, Poland was satisfied with 
the division of voting power according to the number of inhabitants. But 
the pivotal ąuestion remains: “what will the time Schedule look like?'
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